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Can Political Participation Prevent Crime? 










Democratic theory and prior empirical work support the view that political 
participation, by promoting social integration and pro-social attitudes, reduces 
one’s propensity for anti-social behavior, such as committing a crime. Previous 
investigations examine observational data, which are vulnerable to bias if omitted 
factors affect both propensity to participate and risk of criminality or their reports. 
A field experiment encouraging 552,525 subjects aged 18-20 to register and vote 
confirms previous observational findings of the negative association between 
participation and subsequent criminality. However, comparing randomly formed 
treatment and control groups reveals that the intervention increased participation 
but did not reduce subsequent criminality. Our results suggest that while 
participation is correlated with criminality, it exerts no causal effect on 













Multiple strands of normative political theory provide detailed arguments about the ways 
that political engagement transforms the individual, thereby reducing the likelihood that she will 
break the law. The posited mechanisms are many and varied, and here we highlight several. For 
instance, it has been argued that political participation, by requiring individuals to weigh 
competing arguments about what choices are best, encourages them to consider the perspectives 
and interests of fellow citizens (de Tocqueville [1840] 1969; Mill [1861] 1978). Engagement 
through this and other avenues may thereby reduce the tendency to act without regard for others 
(Rousseau [1762] 1968). As citizens develop a broader perspective, this may, in turn, reduce the 
likelihood that they behave anti-socially. Thus, participation may encourage a “democratic 
character,” an enlightened self-interest incompatible with criminal acts that harm others. The act 
of participation may also trigger greater community engagement and interaction with community 
members who are themselves active participants in the community’s collective life. 
In addition, participation may change attitudes toward the law if it serves to legitimate the 
state. When voting, all individuals are given the chance to express their views, in the process 
learning that those views are worthy and that legitimate avenues exist for expression of their 
interests. This development of a sense of political efficacy (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970) 
combined with the idea that “one has a stake” in the system encourages respect for the 
democratic process (Thompson 1970), which extends to agreeing that even in cases in which the 
particular outcome of governance is not preferred, one should still abide by it. This respect for 
the law may also arise because one who participates comes to understand collective decision 
making as a means for problem solving that is superior to avenues such as violence or resistance. 
Although these mechanisms provide a theoretical basis to suppose that participation 
might produce more law-abiding citizens, there is to date only modest supporting empirical 
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evidence (Uggen and Manza 2004; Uggen and Schaefer 2005). Those who participate are much 
less likely than those who do not to be convicted of crimes. However, this association does not 
demonstrate that participation causes a reduction in criminal tendencies. There are many reasons 
why those who choose to vote differ from those who do not. And these differences, which might 
include greater engagement in community life, greater educational attainment, and so on, might 
also be directly related to the propensity to engage in criminal behavior. 
In this paper we present evidence that allows us to estimate the causal effect of political 
participation on the likelihood that an individual engages in criminal behavior for a particularly 
interesting population: young adults of color in the United States. Specifically, we present results 
from a large-scale field experiment that permits us to address some of the challenges in assessing 
the causal effects of participation. The subject population is approximately 550,000 non-white 
young adults who were included in a randomized controlled trial conducted during the 
November 2010 election cycle in the United States. This design, in which some subjects were 
randomly chosen to receive a pre-election intervention aimed at increasing voting, overcomes the 
problems inherent in observational analysis, namely that individuals who vote do so for reasons 
(unobserved by the researcher) that might also be correlated with the probability of becoming 
involved with the criminal justice system. Further, unlike some prior work, we use administrative 
records to measure both participation and criminality—operationalized as being under state 
supervision—thereby avoiding concerns about systematic measurement error in survey reports of 
participation and criminality. 
In the next section we review the existing empirical evidence regarding the link between 
participation and criminal behavior, as well as additional relevant literature from social 
psychology. In the subsequent section we describe our data and methods. The sections that 
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follow present two analyses of the data. In the first, we perform an observational analysis of the 
relationship between participation and criminality within the control and treatment groups. We 
show that, as suggested by previous research, there is a strong association between non-
participation and criminal convictions. Those young adults who voted in 2010 are 55% less 
likely to be under state supervision two years later than those who did not vote (0.4% vs 0.9%). 
Next, we use the random assignment employed in the experimental design to estimate the 
causal effect of participation on criminality. We begin by laying out the conditions under which 
an experimental registration intervention can be used to produce consistent estimates of the 
causal effect of voting on subsequent criminal behavior. We next present our experimental 
estimates, showing that those treated in the experiment are about .5 percentage points more likely 
to vote in the November 2010 election, an increase of 19% relative to the control group. 
However, in sharp contrast to the observational result, the treatment group shows no signs of a 
reduction in state supervision. Thus, when randomly formed groups are compared, the observed 
negative correlation between voting and criminality does not appear to represent a causal effect. 
Finally, we discuss the limitations and implications of our analysis, as well as directions 
for future research. Substantively, it appears that simply casting a ballot is insufficient to reduce 
the propensity to engage in criminal behavior or to begin an immediate virtuous cycle that 
culminates in behaviors that make one less prone to incarceration (as would be predicted by the 
growing literature on the large effects of “minor” psychological interventions). Beyond this 
finding itself, this empirical pattern also suggests we should reconsider theoretical arguments 
(some of which may have been spurred in part by the robust observational correlation between 
voting and all sorts of pro-social outcomes) for why voting or other forms of civic engagement 
might produce pro-social behavior, as well as the possibility that voting might not be a 
 4 
meaningful enough form of participation to directly facilitate the development of better citizens. 
Methodologically, our work underscores the extreme challenges facing empirical researchers in 
testing normative theories about how political participation may alter individuals (a fact 
highlighted by the large differences between the observational and experimental results we 
present). When our prior beliefs about the effectiveness of interventions are based on designs for 
which there are reasonable concerns about fundamental sources of bias (such as unobserved 
heterogeneity or omitted variables that explain both treatment assignment and outcomes), then 
even the apparent precision of a highly significant regression result may be misleading. 
Consequently, we should not be surprised when improved research designs yield results far 
different from prior studies. 
In summary, our credibly identified study, even after noting its limitations, allows us 
confidently to reject the large negative association between voting and subsequent incarceration 
found in prior observational research (and in our own data, when analyzed in that fashion). 
Furthermore, even if the estimates from prior research are used as an informative baseline, our 
results should nonetheless cause scholars to revise substantially downward (toward zero) their 
estimate of the association between participation and criminality. If voting did reduce criminality 
(or any other undesirable behavior), the low cost of encouraging participation relative to the cost 
of, for example, incarceration, would make it an extremely cost-effective policy intervention. 
Unfortunately, although there may be many important reasons to encourage participation by all 
citizens, our research suggests that this particular strategy is unlikely to substantially reduce 
incarceration. 
Literature Review 
Above we described several theoretical arguments for how participation might promote pro-
social behavior in general, and reduce criminality in particular. In this section we review the 
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evidence. Several previous studies demonstrate strong associations between participation in pro-
social behavior and reduced criminality after controlling for a number of known confounding 
factors (e.g., demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and prior anti-social and criminal 
behavior). Work by Uggen and colleagues, for example, links past voting (Uggen and Manza 
2004) and volunteerism (Uggen and Janikula 1999) to reductions in reported criminality. Uggen 
and Janikula conclude that “by entering and committing to pro-social volunteer service, young 
adults may alter lifelong trajectories of deviant behavior, political participation, and civic 
engagement” (355). Similarly, a number of studies have focused on those already convicted of a 
crime and investigate how participation may reduce the risk of recidivism. Underlying this 
research is evidence that in places where felons are disenfranchised they report that the stigma 
associated with being unable to vote makes it harder to resume one’s place in society after 
release (Uggen et al. 2004, see also Behan 2012). Empirically, Maruna (2001) shows that 
feelings of civic integration correlate with reduced recidivism, while Nirel et al. (1997) find that 
Israeli prisoners assigned to community service in lieu of prison are less likely to recidivate. In 
the U.S., Uggen and Schaefer (2005) show that released prisoners who voted after being released 
from prison were also less likely to recidivate. Practitioners have also embraced voting as a 
means to reduce recidivism, with the Florida Parole Commission (Pate 2011) crediting the 
restoration of voting rights with reducing the likelihood of returning to prison. 
The evidence that voting might plausibly lead to a decline in criminal activity dovetails 
with the growing empirical literature in experimental social psychology documenting how small 
interventions can lead to large changes in subject behavior. Examples of these studies include 
research showing how a minor educational intervention—writing a short essay about why a 
chosen value is very important to the subject (as opposed to someone else)—produces a 
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significant improvement in students’ grades over the subsequent three years of schooling (Cohen 
et al. 2006). The explanation offered for the obvious disproportionate relationship between a 
small number of 15-minute interventions and the large and persistent improvement in subject 
grades is that the initial intervention is the trigger for a virtuous cycle, in which more 
constructive attitudes are rewarded by better results, reinforcing the more positive attitudes and 
inducing additional positive behavior. Similarly, voting might create a more positive social 
outlook that then triggers a self-reinforcing cycle of subsequent positive social interactions. 
Despite the previous research, there are still many reasons for concern that the observed 
association in prior research between participation and criminality may not be causal. Normative 
theorists are cognizant of the important challenges to moving from intuition and association to 
demonstrated causality. Mansbridge, for example, perceptively and candidly writes: 
Participation does make better citizens. I believe it, but I can't prove it…. [I]n the case of 
the educative effects of participation… the postulated effects took subtle forms that could 
not easily be captured in empirical studies of relatively small numbers of people. First, 
although cross-sectional studies showed that people who participated in democratic 
politics also had many other admirable qualities, it was hard to find situations for study in 
which a researcher could measure the qualities of people before and after the addition of 
participation to see if participation itself had any causal effect in producing those 
admirable qualities…. Only a massive (and therefore prohibitively expensive) study 
would be likely to pick up the effects on character of participation in politics… (1995, 1-
6) 
 
As Mansbridge notes, participation may simply be a marker of the same pro-social 
tendencies that would cause someone to avoid breaking the law (again or in the first place). 
Thus, it may not be that participation leads to the world view that discourages criminality, but 
instead that there is some unobserved factor that causes both participation and a tendency to 
abide by the law. The danger from spurious correlation due to an unmeasured factor is the central 
difficulty in establishing causality in this and many other areas of empirical research. 
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An additional problem that empirical research faces is measurement error. Researchers 
often rely on self-reports of participation, criminality, and other factors in trying to assess the 
relationship between participation and criminality. But if individuals misrepresent these activities 
in systematic ways (e.g., if someone who has not voted and has not gone to prison is more likely 
to report that they voted than someone who has not voted but did go to prison), then measured 
participation may be negatively correlated with measured criminality.1 Similarly, individuals 
who vote could underreport their criminality relative to those who do not. Fortunately, these 
threats to inference can be reduced through a randomized inducement of participation and use of 
administrative records rather than self-reports. 
Data 
The dataset for our primary analysis is created by matching information from a large-scale field 
experiment aimed at increasing participation among young people to information about their 
criminal behavior. The data about political participation come from an outreach effort conducted 
by the Voter Participation Center (VPC) in 2010. The VPC is a nonpartisan organization devoted 
to increasing the participation of historically underrepresented groups.2 The VPC contracted with 
an outside vendor of student lists to obtain information about individuals born between June 14, 
1990 (turning 18 in June 2008) and September 30, 1992 (turning 18 in September 2010) and 
residing in one of 13 targeted states (AZ, CO, FL, IL, KY, MD, MO, NM, NV, OH, PA, TX, and 
WA). Consistent with the VPC’s mission of increasing participation by underrepresented groups, 
                                                 
1 For example, Vavreck (2007) finds that more educated and more politically engaged 
individuals are more likely to overreport turnout. 
2 See http://www.voterparticipation.org/about-us/, retrieved May 2016. 
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individuals were retained in their sample if they were identified as non-white.3 Records were 
then excluded if the individual was already registered to vote, deceased, had a post office box or 
commercial mailing address, appeared invalid, or had an address that was deemed undeliverable, 
vacant, or seasonal. This initial sample is approximately 664,000 names. 
The VPC’s outreach effort was a randomized field experiment conducted in late August 
2010. They randomly selected 90% of the households4 in their experimental population and sent 
them a non-partisan registration mailing informing them that they were eligible to register to 
vote.5 The mailing included the relevant voter registration form with a postage-paid envelope for 
returning the signed document to the appropriate authority.6 A randomized experiment with a 
young adult population provides the ideal setting for examining the impact of participation on 
criminal behavior. Specifically, a wealth of empirical research demonstrates that among those 
individuals who eventually engage in criminal behavior, criminality largely begins prior to 
turning 20 (see, e.g., Blumstein and Cohen 1987). Thus, targeting this group offers the best 
chance to prevent or disrupt nascent patterns of criminality. At the same time, as with any 
experimental sample, our estimates are valid only for this particular sample. While about 86% of 
all individuals aged 17-18 attend school, for other groups (e.g., for those who have already 
                                                 
3 According to researchers who conducted the initial outreach program for the VPC, race was 
coded by the vendor’s proprietary method that used linguistic characteristics of each name and 
Census demographics for the address to predict individual race. 
4 86% of cases are single-address records. 
5 Tests reported in the supplemental appendix reveal no imbalances across voter file covariates 
(race/ethnicity, gender, and state of residence) in the treatment and control groups.  
6 An example of the mailing appears in the supplemental appendix. 
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dropped out of school, for whites, and for those under state supervision for a juvenile offense) 
patterns could be different. 
In 2011, the VPC’s data were merged with voter file information by Catalist, a private list 
vendor, to obtain the (post-treatment) 2010 registration and voting behavior of these individuals. 
We obtained the data from the experiment at this point. Of the 664,000 records in the sample, 
about .3% had only a year of birth and another 10.8% of records had only a year and month of 
birth.7 Because we require a valid date of birth for our matching procedure, we exclude those 
records, yielding a sample of 590,472 records. In order to identify individuals under state 
supervision, we obtained administrative records of state supervision from a subset of the states in 
the original experiment sample. 
Our data sources are outlined in supplemental appendix Table S2. To include a state in 
our analysis, which necessitates matching individuals in the experiment sample to these records, 
we required information about the name and date of birth of each offender. These data are public 
records, but the level of detail contained in the record varies across states. In most cases, we were 
only able to obtain information about individuals currently incarcerated in state prisons, but in 
some states the records either include information that allows us to avoid coding as incarcerated 
those whose offense likely took place prior to Election Day 2010 or a broader set of state 
supervision statuses (e.g., parole and/or probation). As noted below, all results are robust to 
analysis limited to these subsets of states. More generally, because we lack information about 
prior interactions with the criminal justice system, our estimates reflect a combination of reduced 
                                                 
7 For records with only a month and year of birth, day of birth was often recorded by the original 
research team as the 1st of the month. For this reason, we exclude all cases with birthdays on the 
first of the month. These exclusions are implemented using pre-treatment measures. 
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criminality among those who have not previously interacted with the criminal justice system and 
diminished recidivism among those who already have. (As with any other source of unobserved 
heterogeneity, these potential differences will not bias the results of our experimental analysis.) 
To merge the state supervision records to the experiment sample, we used the state of 
residence, name, and date of birth information from the experiment sample. Records were 
matched if the state, date of birth, last name, and first initial of first name were identical. Table 1 
lists the number of records from the experiment sample for each state, as well as the number of 
individuals matched to the state criminal supervision records. We note that in addition to being 
limited to the subset of criminal records available in each state, this matching will only succeed 
for individuals who continue to reside in the same state as in 2010.8 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
Finally, in order to obtain additional information about the places in which these 
individuals lived, we successfully geocoded 97.3% of the 568,101 records shown in Table 1 to 
census block groups using ArcGIS 10.1.9 We then merged in 2007-2011 American Community 
Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates for variables used in our statistical analysis to control for 
unobserved location-specific factors correlated with both the likelihood of voting and subsequent 
propensity to be under state supervision, as well as to compensate for the paucity of individual-
                                                 
8 Although the process of matching voter file records to state supervision records is imperfect, 
the error rate should be the same in both the treatment and control groups. 
9 Records were considered successfully geocoded if the ArcGIS match score was greater than 85 
(out of 100) and there was a unique street address for the highest match score. 
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level covariates available in the original data files. Our final dataset consists of 552,525 
records.10 
Observational Benchmark: Those Who Vote are Less Likely to Become Criminals 
What is the effect of participation on an individual’s subsequent criminality? We begin by 
examining the individual-level relationship between voting and subsequent criminal supervision. 
The purposes of this analysis are to (1) replicate prior research showing a correlation between 
participation and subsequent criminality and (2) provide face validity for our procedure matching 
subject records to the incarceration data (if the matched data produce the same observational 
correlation found in prior work, it is unlikely that we have failed to reliably locate youths who 
are later incarcerated). If we find that pattern in these data when analyzed observationally, then 
our next step is to ascertain whether the relationship persists when we analyze the data using the 
experimental design. 
To begin, Table 2 reports OLS estimates in which we examine the association between 
individual-level participation and the probability of being under state supervision after 
accounting for individual-level race and gender, state of residence, and place-level ACS 
measures. Because many of the coefficients are small in magnitude, we code this and the other 
binary dependent variables as 0=no, 100=yes (rather than 0,1) so that the coefficients have fewer 
leading zeros. Thus a coefficient of -2.0, for example, would mean that a unit change in that 
variable is associated with a 2 percentage point decrease in the probability of being under 
supervision. In the column (1) specification, which does not include a measure of participation, 
we find that both African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be under state supervision 
                                                 
10 There are no covariate imbalances between the treatment and control groups for this final 
sample (see tests in the supplemental appendix). 
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than other nonwhites, women and those whose gender is unknown are less likely to be under 
supervision than males, and that standard measures of place-level disadvantage and crime (e.g., 
concentrated urban areas, etc.) are associated with increased risks of incarceration. 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
In the remaining columns, we examine the association between voting in 2010 and being 
under state supervision for different subsets of the data. In column (2) we find that voting 
reduces the risk of being under state supervision by 55%, or from 0.88% to 0.40% (p<.001). This 
reduction is substantively large. Hypothetically, if all 18-22 year olds voted instead of none of 
them voting, and if the same relationship was observed for other demographic groups, it would 
correspond to almost 105,000 fewer individuals in prison.11 Results are substantively the same 
when we instead estimate probit models (those complete results appear in the supplemental 
appendix, and average marginal effects estimates of changing from not voting to voting are 
reported in the bottom of the table). In column (3) we restrict our analysis to those cases for 
which a predicted risk of state supervision measure that we calculate is less than .01 (1%).12 This 
                                                 
11 According to 2015 Census estimates, there are a little over 21.8 million 18-22 year olds in the 
US. The coefficient is -0.48 percentage points. If all voted rather than none, the reduction in the 
number incarcerated is 104,785 individuals.  
12 This predicted risk score was obtained by estimating a logistic regression using records in the 
control group (those not sent a treatment letter in the field experiment) to predict the probability 
each individual in our dataset was under state supervision. That model, estimated separately for 
gender groups (male, female, or unknown, as reported by the list vendor), includes indicators for 
whether an individual is black or Hispanic (an exclusive coding, with all other races making up 
the excluded category), state fixed effects, and the various ACS survey measures in Table 2. 
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group comprises about 70% of the sample. For this sample, which we refer to as the low-risk 
sample, the average proportional effect estimate is comparable: voting reduces the risk of 
supervision by 57% (to .14% from .34%). Column (4) measures the relationship between voting 
and the risk of being under state supervision for those with a predicted risk of being under 
supervision greater than .01; we refer to this group as the high-risk sample. Those in the high-
risk sample who vote are 60% less likely to be under state supervision than those in the high risk 
sample who do not vote (0.98% vs. 2.45%).13 We use this partitioning by predicted risk of 
supervision in the analysis that follows to demonstrate that it is not just individuals who appear, 
ex ante, to be at a low risk of being incarcerated who respond to the outreach encouraging 
participation. That is, the experimental intervention is effective in encouraging participation 
among individuals with both low and higher ex ante predicted rates of incarceration. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Using the coefficient estimates from that model, we predict the risk measure for the entire 
sample using each individual’s observed (pre-treatment) characteristics. See the supplemental 
appendix for additional analysis and the underlying coefficient estimates. 
13 In the supplemental appendix, we show these results are robust to limiting the analysis to 
states where it is less likely that individuals were incarcerated for a crime they had committed 
prior to the 2010 election. In Ohio and Washington we observe when incarceration began and do 
not code as incarcerated individuals whose admission date is before June 1, 2011, while in Texas 
we observe date of offense and do not code as incarcerated individuals whose offense date 
precedes the 2010 election. In the supplemental appendix, we also show similar results in states 
where our records of supervision include more low-level punishments and assess the relationship 
between registration and the likelihood of coming under state supervision. 
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Overall, these data suggest a strong association between political participation and the 
subsequent likelihood that someone is incarcerated. We find that voters are less likely to end up 
under state supervision than non-voters. What remains uncertain, however, is whether these 
associations are causal in nature, the question we take up in the next section. 
Experimental Analysis: Randomly Induced Participation Does Not Reduce Criminality 
This section is divided into two parts. The first describes our strategy for measuring the causal 
effect of participation, and the second presents the experimental estimates of this causal effect. 
Identification Strategy 
In this sub-section we formalize the problem of measuring the causal effect of voting on 
subsequent incarceration.14 We first introduce some notation and then show that under standard 
assumptions an experiment can yield a consistent (asymptotically unbiased) estimate of the 
causal effect of voting.15 Readers familiar with the technical assumptions of causal identification 
in the potential outcomes framework using randomized experiments may wish to skip ahead. 
                                                 
14 We assume the effect of participation occurs via voting, rather than registration, since the prior 
theoretical literature stresses how deliberative and participatory activities—like voting—are 
transformative. In the supplemental appendix we present parallel analyses assuming that 
registration is the relevant participatory act. Note that our, or any other, experiment that perturbs 
both registration and voting, cannot be used to assess through which causal pathway these effects 
manifest—one reason that an explicit statement of the exclusion restriction must build on theory. 
15 Our technical framework is equivalent to an experiment with two-way non-compliance. 
Treatment is voting and some assigned to the treatment group do not vote (are untreated) while 
some assigned to the control group are treated (do vote). For a discussion of identification and 
estimation of causal effects in such circumstances, see Gerber and Green (2012), chapter 6. 
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Let Yi(Vi,Zi) represent whether individual i is subsequently incarcerated (Yi = 1 if 
incarcerated, 0 otherwise) given Vi (which is equal to 1 if the individual votes, 0 otherwise) and 
Zi (which is equal to 1 if the individual is in the experimental treatment group, 0 otherwise). Y is 
referred to as a potential outcome for individual i and Yi may take on different values depending 
on Vi and Zi. We will assume that Y, criminality, may be a function of whether the individual 
votes, V, but that, given V, Y does not depend directly on Z (recall that Z describes whether the 
subject was assigned to the treatment or control group). This assumption, our assumption 1, is 
referred to as the exclusion restriction, as it implies that we can write Y as Y(V), excluding Z 
from the expression. 
In words, the exclusion restriction requires that the effect of the treatment assignment, Z, 
does not affect Y except through its effect on V, whether the subject votes or not. Applying this to 
the logic of causal influence in our study, what differs for subjects when Z=1 versus 0 is that a 
subject in the treatment group is sent a mailing encouraging participation that the control group 
does not receive. Our exclusion restriction is therefore that receiving the mailing does not alter 
the propensity to take criminal actions that lead to state supervision, except (possibly) if the 
mailing alters the subject’s voting behavior. 
Using the exclusion restriction, we may define the average causal effect of voting on 
criminality as: 
(1) E(Yi(Vi=1)) – E(Yi(Vi=0)) = E(Yi(1) – Yi(0)) 
where the function E(X) represents the population average of X.16 
                                                 
16 Our notation assumes that the consequential factor for a subject’s treatment and outcome is her 
own treatment assignment and voting, and not that of the other subjects. This approach follows 
 16 
Our goal is to use the data we are able to gather from an experiment to estimate a causal 
effect of voting. To do this we must link the average causal effect of voting (equation 1) to 
population quantities we are able to estimate from the experimental design. A first step is to 
categorize the subjects according to how their voting behavior responds to assignment to 
treatment (Z=1) or control (Z=0). We consider three patterns of individual response: 
1. Always Voters (type = AV), who vote whether assigned to treatment or control, 
2. Never Voters (type = NV) who do not vote in either treatment or control, and 
3. Compliers (type = C), who vote when assigned to treatment but do not vote when 
assigned to control. 
There is an additional pattern, in which subjects vote when they are not contacted about 
participation (Z=0), but are induced to not vote if they are contacted (Z=1). We assume that this 
perverse sub-group can be ignored. Formally, this is the assumption of monotonicity, which is 
our second identification assumption. Monotonicity (the assumption that treatment assignment 
affects V in one direction) is summarized as the idea that assignment to the treatment group 
either has no effect on the subjects’ decision to vote or that it encourages voting. 
Next, we may decompose the population average of Y for the subjects when assigned to 
the treatment group (dropping the “i” subscripts) as: 
(1.1) E(Y|Z=1) = E(Y(V=1)|subject is an AV)*P(AV) + E(Y(V=0|subject is a NV)*P(NV)  
+ E(Y(1)|subject is C)*P(C), 
where P(x) is the proportion of the subjects who are type x. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the assumptions in prior empirical and theoretical investigations, which articulate mechanisms 
for a direct effect of participation on an individual’s mindset and habits. 
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Similarly, we may decompose the population average of Y for subjects when assigned to 
the control group as: 
(1.2) E(Y|Z=0) = E(Y(V=1)|subject is an AV)*P(AV) + E(Y(V=0|subject is a NV)*P(NV) +  
E(Y(0)|subject is C)*P(C). 
Notice that the only source of difference in the population average Y for the subjects 
when assigned to the treatment group versus control group is due to the change in behavior of the 
compliers, the type of individuals who vote only if assigned to the treatment group (the last term 
in each equation).17 An implication of this is that we can only estimate the causal effect for this 
subgroup of individuals, the compliers; since the other types are only observed either voting or 
not voting, we never produce the data required to estimate Y in both the voting and non-voting 
state for these types. Algebraically this is seen when we examine the difference between the 
population averages given in (1.1) and (1.2): 
(2) E(Y|Z=1) – E(Y|Z=0) =  
E(Y(1)|subject is C)*P(C) - E(Y(0)|subject is C)*P(C) =  
[E(Y(1)|subject is C) - E(Y(0)|subject is C)]*P(C) = 
[E(Y(1)-Y(0)) | subject is C]*P(C). 
Rearranging (2), the average causal effect on Y of voting for compliers can be written as: 
(3) [E(Y(1)-Y(0)|subject is C] = [E(Y|Z=1) – E(Y|Z=0)] / P(C). 
Under the stated assumptions, we can estimate the causal effect of voting on criminality 
if we can estimate [E(Y|Z=1) – E(Y|Z=0)] divided by the proportion of compliers in the 
population, P(C). Turning first to the numerator of this expression, when the treatment and 
                                                 
17 Note that random assignment means that, in expectation, the proportion of each type of subject 
is the same across the treatment and control groups. 
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control groups are formed by random assignment, an unbiased estimator of the average 
difference in the outcome when assigned to treatment and control for the population of subjects, 
[E(Y|Z=1) – E(Y|Z=0)], is the sample difference of means. This quantity can be estimated by the 
slope coefficient from a regression of Yi on Zi, the subject’s incarceration status regressed on her 
group assignment. This quantity is also known as the experiment’s ITT, the intent to treat effect. 
Similarly, an unbiased estimate for the proportion of compliers in the population, P(C), is 
the difference in the share of the subjects who are actually treated (that is, who voted) in the 
treatment group minus the share who voted in the control group. We reiterate here that “treated” 
takes on a different meaning in this context than will be familiar to most readers. Treatment is 
defined not simply by whether one was in the treatment group, but rather whether one votes, 
which is the behavior of all Always Voters as well as the Compliers in the treatment group. The 
quantity P(C) can be estimated by the slope coefficient from a regression of Vi, treatment status, 
on Zi, individual group assignment. We will call this estimate α. A consistent estimate of the 
complier average causal effect (CACE) is obtained by calculating the ratio of these two 
differences in sample means. 
(4) CACE = ITT/ α. 
Rather than separately estimating the quantities to form this ratio, the CACE and its 
standard errors can be estimated directly as a two-stage least squares model in which Y is a 
function of V and Z, and the experimental group assignment (Z) is used as an instrument for V. 
Additional precision can be gained by including covariates in the first and second stages.18 
                                                 
18 In the SA, we present parallel analyses without covariates. 
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Experimental Estimates 
Mann (2011) provides complete details about the experiment described above and 
analysis focused on the effects of the outreach on registration and participation. Here, we present 
analyses for the subset of the original data used in the remainder of this paper (those living in 
states where we obtained records of criminal supervision, with complete birthdays, and for 
whom geocoding was successful for inclusion of the ACS measures). 
Table 3 presents statistical analyses of the effect of the VPC’s mailing efforts on voting 
in 2010.19 These are the “first-stage” estimates in a two-stage least squares estimator.20 In 
columns (1) and (2), we present the results for the entire sample. Models are shown both with 
(column [1]) and without (column [2]) covariates. In this sample, we find that 2.5% of the 
control group voted, and turnout was .5 percentage points higher among those sent the 
registration mailing (p<.001). This corresponds to an increase in voting of about 19%. We note 
that these effects are estimated with great precision; the t-statistics for the treatment effects are 
almost 7. Notice that in this sample the F-statistic for the first stage is well above the rule of 
thumb value of 10 suggested to avoid bias due to weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997), 
though, admittedly, the treatment effect is modest (see the next section for an extended 
discussion of the precision of our two-stage least squares estimates). 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
Before presenting the second-stage analysis, however, we consider the effect of the 
intervention for the low-risk and high-risk samples analyzed in Table 2. Columns (3) and (4) 
                                                 
19 For all experimental analysis, we report standard errors clustered at the household level, the 
level at which randomization took place. 
20 Parallel estimates using probit in the supplemental appendix yield similar results. 
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present this analysis for the low-risk sample. Among these subjects, the treatment assignment has 
an effect on voting that is comparable to that found for the sample as a whole, and group 
assignment is highly statistically significant. For the high-risk sample, treatment assignment 
increased voting by .3 percentage points (columns [5] and [6], 12.9%, p<.05). This is a 
somewhat smaller absolute and proportional effect than for the entire sample, showing that more 
at-risk individuals are less likely to participate absent outreach and increase their participation 
less in reaction to these outreach efforts. 
We can now estimate the quantities necessary to answer our primary question of interest: 
Does participation reduce the risk of subsequent incarceration? There are several ways to 
undertake this analysis, and so we present multiple approaches here. The key intuition that joins 
all of these approaches is that, unlike our observational analysis above, here we are not relying 
on naturalistic variation in participation. That is, whereas before we could not ascertain whether 
participation reduced criminality or if instead some other factor explained both a greater 
proclivity to participate in politics and a reduced risk of committing a crime, here we take 
advantage of the fact that the experiment randomly assigned some individuals to receive the 
outreach letter. Being sent the outreach letter is therefore unrelated to any differences in expected 
participation and criminality. But because being sent the letter is associated with an increase in 
voting, this randomly induced variation allows us to assess the effect of participation on the risk 
of being incarcerated. 
First, we present a reduced-form model estimating the relationship between being sent a 
treatment letter and the risk of being under state supervision. This is the estimate of the 
experiment’s ITT effect. This model, estimated for different subsets of the sample, appears in 
columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 4. This allows us to assess the direct relationship between 
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being randomly assigned to receive a mailing encouraging participation and the subsequent risk 
of being under state supervision. It is agnostic as to the mechanism by which such a relationship 
could take place. As the OLS estimates make clear, however, we do not find that the 
experimental intervention reduces the risk of criminality. For the entire sample (column [1]), the 
low-risk sample (column [3]), and the high-risk sample (column [5]), we find that treatment is 
associated with either a slight increase in the risk of being under state supervision (although none 
of these effects aside from the low-risk sample are statistically significant at conventional levels) 
or a very small negative point estimate (with a t-statistic of close to zero). Parallel analysis for 
these reduced-form estimates using probit, which produces the same conclusions for all these 
columns in Table 4, appears in the supplemental appendix. 
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Second, we can assess the direct relationship between voting and reduced criminality by 
undertaking an instrumental variables analysis. This approach relies on the fact that the 
experimental intervention, as we know from the Table 3 analysis, increased voting. If we assume 
that change in participation is the only mechanism by which the mailing can affect future 
criminality (that is, if the letters did not themselves reduce the risk of criminal behavior, but 
could instead do so only by altering engagement with the political system through voting, i.e. the 
exclusion restriction described above), we can use the experimental design to estimate the effect 
of participation on criminality without the risk of bias that is present in our observational 
analysis due to unobserved factors that affect both behaviors. This is the estimate of the 
experiment’s CACE, formalized above. 
In the instrumental variables analysis, we first predict the probability of voting using the 
same specification presented in Table 3. We then use predicted participation, with exogenous 
variation induced by the randomly assigned experimental treatment, along with the other control 
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variables shown in Table 4, to predict differences in the risk of state supervision. These two-
stage least squares estimates also do not provide any evidence that increasing participation 
reduces the risk of criminal behavior. In column (2) we estimate that voting increases the risk of 
supervision (by 9.2 percentage points), but the effect is imprecisely estimated and 
indistinguishable from 0. 
With the exception of the low-risk sample, this pattern—positive or approximately zero, 
but imprecise, estimates for the effect of participation on criminality—is repeated for the other 
models in Table 4. The only statistically significant finding is that, for the low-risk sample, 
voting is positively associated with criminality (column [4]). We interpret this unexpected 
relationship as due to chance, and view it as an unlikely finding if, in fact, the true effect of 
participation was a material decrease in criminality. In sum, there is no evidence that 
experimentally increasing participation is associated with reductions in criminal behavior. In the 
supplemental appendix, we report virtually identical results when we limit the analysis to states 
for which we can exclude those whose criminal behavior leading to incarceration likely pre-dates 
treatment implementation or have information on lower-level punishments (i.e., punishments 
other than time in prison). 
Overall, these results are sobering. While experimental outreach can increase political 
participation for this sample of youth, there is no evidence that it reduces criminality. The 
observational correlation between participating and avoiding being incarcerated is therefore not a 
causal one, but instead most likely the result of the joint effect of some omitted factor on both 
rates of participating and a tendency to obey the law. In an experimental setting in which 
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participation is randomly manipulated, inducing individuals to participate makes them no less 
likely to violate the law than those who were not contacted.21 
Implications for Estimates of the Relationship Between Participation and Criminality 
Our experimental estimates of the effect of voting on subsequent criminality are positive and 
statistically insignificant (the reduced-form estimates of the direct effect of the mailing are very 
close to zero). This leads naturally to a question of how these new findings should be 
incorporated into our beliefs about the causal effect of political participation on criminality that 
were formed based on prior research. For example, Uggen and Manza (2004; Figure 2) present 
analysis showing that those who had never previously been arrested and who voted in 1996 are 
6.6 points less likely to be arrested between 1997 and 2000 than those who did not vote in 1996. 
This comparison has a 95% confidence interval of approximately -3.6 to -12.4 points. Our 
instrumental variables estimate of the effect of voting on subsequent incarceration for the entire 
sample, by contrast, is a positive 9.2 points with a 95% confidence interval of approximately -7.3 
to 16.4 points. Thus, the 95% confidence interval for our experimental estimate includes Uggen 
and Manza’s (2004) point estimate. Focusing only on the low risk sample, which is perhaps 
analogous to those who have never previously been arrested, our estimate is instead 11.6 points 
                                                 
21 A potential concern is that one must vote multiple times to reduce the propensity for criminal 
behavior. Despite this possibility (discussed in the conclusion), our single election test is justified 
because prior work has operationalized and provided evidence for the relationship in this 
manner. In addition, because criminal behavior for those who engage in it generally begins 
around when they obtain the right to vote (i.e., turn 18), a single election must be sufficient time 
for the relationship to work if participation is to be an effective means to avert an initial turn to 
criminal behavior. 
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with a 95% confidence interval of 1.2 to 22.0 points. How should we think about what this new 
study adds to existing evidence? 
One possible approach is to ignore any concerns about unobserved heterogeneity as a 
potential explanation for the result reported in Uggen and Manza and simply incorporate the 
information from each study as independent estimates of some unobserved population 
coefficient, which is the true effect of voting on criminality. While deciding how to weight 
different studies is difficult, if given equal weight, the ex post estimate would be that the true 
population coefficient for how voting affects subsequent criminality is that it increases it by a 
statistically insignificant 1.3 points (95% confidence interval about -7 points to +10 points). This 
would lead us to conclude there is no causal relationship between voting and criminality. 
Alternatively, we might give the prior research greater weight because it is apparently more 
precise, for example by weighting it four times as much as the new experimental estimate, in 
which case our joint point estimate would be -3.3 points with a 95% confidence interval from -8 
points to 1 point. In either case, the implications are qualitatively the same: On equal or even 
reduced footing, these results would lead us to revise downward (toward zero) our estimates of 
the causal effect of voting on criminality. 
Although it is common to combine research in this fashion (see, for example, Lau et al.’s 
[1999] meta-analysis of the effect of negative advertising), these approaches are likely to be 
fundamentally misleading. That is because the estimates reported in the prior research are not 
unbiased because they cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity. That is, even if we had a 
very large population of individuals and estimated an extremely precise (i.e., standard errors near 
0) negative correlation between voting and subsequent criminality, this estimate would not be 
informative of the causal effect of interest because it is a combination of the true causal effect 
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and a bias term of unknown and uncertain magnitude. For this reason, in forming an update 
about causal effects, one should not be misled by the apparent precision of prior observational 
research, and should instead be justified in treating the estimated correlation as largely 
uninformative about the causal effect of interest (Gerber et al. 2004). How do we know this is a 
problem in our application? For one, our own observational data shows a robust (negative) 
correlation between voting and subsequent criminality, but that result is not sustained when we 
leverage our experimental design. For another, Uggen and Manza find that their estimates are 
fragile: as they control for observable factors that explain differences between those who vote 
and those who do not, their estimates decay toward 0 (and are no longer statistically significant 
in some specifications). For this reason, our best assessment of the evidence is that our data lead 
to an unbiased estimate that is statistically indistinguishable from 0. 
What does this mean in practical terms? One simple way to answer this question is to ask, 
given our estimate, what is the chance that the true effect is negative (that is, that voting does 
reduce criminality)? We can calculate this quantity from our experimental design using an exact 
randomization test in which we simulate random assignment to treatment and estimate the 
reduced-form relationship between treatment and criminality. If we adjust this quantity by the 
observed difference in voting between the actual treatment and control groups (the first stage of 
the two-stage least squares estimator), we can calculate the expected distribution of the two-stage 
least squares estimate of the effect of voting on criminality under the sharp null of no treatment 
effect. In 100,000 simulations, this is less than our observed coefficient estimate 86% of the 
time, implying a p-value of .14. If we apply a similar sampling distribution to our +9.1 point 
estimate, we calculate that the probability we would observe this estimate given a true coefficient 
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of -6.6 or larger (more negative) is less than .03. Thus, our estimate alone, despite its apparent 
imprecision, is powerful enough to safely reject the large negative estimate found in prior work. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
A classical justification for democracy is that self-government is more than just a method of 
preference aggregation; democracy also shapes citizens. Engaged citizenship results in the 
development of a set of skills that facilitates productive group interactions. The give and take of 
public debate teaches respect for differences, while the need to persuade others encourages 
empathy by rewarding those who learn to see the world though their fellow citizens’ eyes. 
Empirical scholars have built on these insights to suggest that participation may be a means to 
encourage development of connections to the community and a pro-social mindset, and to 
thereby prevent criminality and reduce recidivism. Prior work has provided highly suggestive 
evidence in support of the posited relationship between participation and criminality. It is 
common to find a robust negative correlation between voting (and other forms of participation) 
and the risk of criminal behavior. In our analysis we confirm this correlation using a large 
sample of youth whose participation and state supervision status are measured using 
administrative records. As in prior research, those who vote are less likely to become criminals 
than non-voters. The reduction in risk is both substantial and statistically significant. 
There are, however, important methodological reasons for caution in interpreting this 
relationship as a causal one. For example, it could well be that voting has no causal effect but is 
merely a marker for factors that cause an individual to be less likely to engage in criminal 
activity. In light of the real possibility of spurious results, we revisit the link between voting and 
criminality and report results from a large-scale field experiment in which young adults were 
randomly encouraged to register and vote. We find that this intervention meaningfully increases 
the propensity to participate in politics, but causes no reduction in subsequent criminal behavior. 
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It appears that inducing participation in the form of voting is very likely not an effective 
mechanism for reducing criminality. 
Our experimental results have several implications. First, it does not appear that the 
direct effect of voting reduces criminal activity. Contrary to the observational findings, “the 
‘mere’ act of voting” (Uggen and Manza 2004: 200) is not enough to produce a measurable 
causal effect on criminal behavior. Second, it does not appear that voting triggers an immediate 
virtuous cycle of subsequent actions and attitude formation (a mechanism posited for the large 
changes produced by apparently “minor” psychological interventions) which leads to a large 
behavioral change from a (relatively) small participatory act, at least in the domain of criminality 
leading to incarceration. If such a cycle develops more slowly or over time, then it would need to 
be started earlier (given that the age range we examine generally corresponds to the period when 
individuals are first prone to criminality) and/or encompass additional opportunities to cast a 
ballot. Third, the null findings suggest the value of re-examining how theoretical arguments for 
why voting might produce pro-social behavior have been deployed in this area. Upon re-
consideration, it appears that the finding that voting does not transform the citizen is, in fact, 
quite consistent with the writings of leading democratic theorists. In the work of Rousseau, Mill, 
and others, participation may include the act of voting, but is much more than simply going to 
the polls. Thus, it may be that voting is “a step in the right direction” toward participation, but it 
is too weak a form of participation to encourage the rich individual development necessary to 
become a better citizen. 
In the work of Pitkin and others (e.g., Pitkin and Schumer 1982), the clearest case for the 
benefits of participation often seem to arise from forms of participation closer to governing than 
voting. That is, what causes one to fully develop as a citizen is participation in the process of 
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debating, governing, compromising, etc., all of which are features of a deeper form of 
participatory democracy than simply showing up to cast an anonymous ballot in a November 
election (Pateman 1970). However, the empirical work inspired by these theories may have 
focused too much on the robust, though possibly spurious, association between voting and other 
outcomes. This suggests researchers might expand the scope of participation to include a richer 
account of citizenship, and then assess the causal effects of this deeper form of participation. If 
pursued based on observational methods, this possible analysis raises the same thorny 
methodological questions about whether those who participate in this way are already different 
from those who do not. Thus one avenue for exploring this question is to seek efforts to 
experimentally encourage these far “deeper” forms of participation and understand their long-
term effects.22 
We present the first large-scale experimental assessment of the effects on criminality of 
randomly induced participation. The experimental findings are sharply different from those of 
the observational benchmark. Our analysis illustrates the value in undertaking experimental tests 
of programmatic interventions that observational analysis suggests produce desirable results. The 
observational work may be suggestive of causality and, when the relationship demonstrated is 
very strong and theoretically grounded, the evidence may be quite convincing. However, in the 
case currently under review, we had both a strong association and theoretical support, and thus 
our negative findings may be read as a cautionary tale. The observational data cannot easily 
account for the myriad ways in which voters are different from non-voters, apart from their 
simple propensity to participate in politics. 
                                                 
22 For example, Wantchekon (2012) reports the effect on turnout of a large-scale deliberation 
experiment in Benin.  
 29 
It is important to note that our experiment is limited in several important ways. First, our 
estimates, like all estimates, rely on certain identification assumptions. In particular, we invoke 
an exclusion restriction, which requires that receiving a mailing has no direct effect on 
subsequent criminal behavior apart from the possible changes catalyzed by enhanced political 
participation. It should be noted that if getting a letter does directly reduce criminality, our 
results would over-estimate the benefits of participation, which were found to be zero. Second, it 
is possible that participation does reduce criminality, but voting is too weak a form of 
participation to have the salutary effects ascribed to democratic engagement. Perhaps it would be 
better to teach the skills of deliberation and engagement, if such skills are the means by which 
individuals come to appreciate the process of lawful governance. Third, the subjects are a single 
population (young adults of color) who were targeted only for a very minimal intervention (a 
single mailing before the 2010 election). We do not know if similar results would hold for 
different populations or different outreach efforts. 
Fourth, we estimate the complier average causal effect of the intervention. Although this 
is arguably the population of greatest relevance for those contemplating an intervention to 
encourage participation, other experiments might induce a different set of individuals to 
participate, and the effect of participation for these individuals might be different than the effect 
of the intervention we study here. Finally, although our findings clearly suggest that there is no 
empirical relationship between encouraging voting and reduced criminality, it would be useful to 
replicate this study to increase the precision of the estimated effects. Although our study leads us 
to conclude that the best guess of the effect of voting on criminality is zero, definitively ruling 
out the possibility of modest deterrent effects requires an even larger study than the one we 
analyze here, or the combination of several studies of similar size. 
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These concerns aside, our work presents the first large-scale experimental test of the 
relationship between political participation and subsequent involvement with the criminal justice 
system. Additionally, departing from prior work, we use administrative records to measure both 
participation and state supervision. Despite compelling observational findings and the allure of 
low-cost efforts to reduce criminality, we find no evidence that experimentally increasing 
participation is associated with reductions in criminal behavior. Unfortunately, while voting may 
be good for people, it does not appear to stop them from becoming criminals. 
References 
Barber, B. (1984). Strong democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Behan, C. (2012). ’Still entitled to our say’: Prisoners’ perspectives on politics. Howard Journal 
of Criminal Justice, 51(1), 16-36. 
Blumstein, A, & Cohen, J. (1987). Characterizing criminal careers. Science, 237(4818), 985-991. 
Cohen, G. L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N., & Master, A. (2006). Reducing the racial achievement gap: A 
social-psychological intervention. Science, 313(5791), 1307-1310. 
de Tocqueville, A. [1840] (1969). Democracy in America. New York: Anchor Books. 
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., & Kaplan, E. H. (2004). The illusion of learning from observational 
data. In I. Shapiro, R. M. Smith, & T. E. Masoud (Eds.), Problems and methods in the 
study of politics (pp. 251-273). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2012). Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation. 
New York: Norton. 
Lau, R. R., Sigelman, L., Heldman, C., & Babbitt, P. (1999). The effects of negative political 
advertisements. American Political Science Review, 93(4), 851-875. 
Mann, C. B. (2011). Eliminating registration barriers. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL 
 31 
Mansbridge, J. (1995). Does participation make better citizens? The Good Society, 5(2), 1-7. 
Maruna, S. (2001). Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives. Washington 
D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
Mill, J. S. [1861] (1978). Considerations on representative government. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill. 
Nirel, R, Landau, S. F., Sebba, L., & Sagiv, B. (1997). The effectiveness of service work. 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 13(1), 73-91. 
Pate, T. M. (2011). Status update: Restoration of civil rights’ (RCR) cases granted 2009 and 
2010. Florida Parole Commission. https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/reports/2009-
2010ClemencyReport.pdf. Accessed 30 August 2016. 
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Pitkin, H. F., & M. Schumer, S. M. (1982). On participation. Democracy, 2(4), 43-54. 
Rousseau, J. [1762] (1968). The social contract. London: Penguin Books. 
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. 
Econometrica, 65(3), 557-586. 
Thompsn, D. F. (1970). The democratic citizen: Social science and democratic theory in the 20th 
century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Uggen, C., & Manza, J. (2004). Voting and subsequent crime and arrest: Evidence from a 
community sample. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 36, 193-215. 
Uggen, C., & Janikula, J. (1999). Volunteerism and arrest in the transition to adulthood. Social 
Forces, 78(1), 331-362. 
 32 
Uggen, C., & Schaefer, S. (2005). Voting and the civic reintegration of former prisoners. 
Manuscript, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. 
Uggen, C., Manza, J., & Behrens, A. (2004). Less than the average citizen. In S. Maruna & R. 
Immarigeon (Eds.), After crime and punishment (pp. 261-293). Devon, UK: Willan. 
Vavreck, L. (2007). The exaggerated effect of advertising on turnout: The dangers of self-
reports. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2(4), 325-343. 
Wantchekon, L. (2012). How does policy deliberation affect voting behavior? Evidence from a 
campaign experiment in Benin. Manuscript, Princeton University. 
Table 1: Field Experiment Sample and Number and Proportion of Records Matched to Supervision Records, by State 
 
State 
Number of Individuals in Field 
Experiment 
Individuals with Supervision 
Record Matches 
Proportion of Individuals 
Matched 
AZ 26,522 142 .0054 
CO 14,870 85 .0057 
FL 87,057 2,225 .0256 
IL 72,513 754 .0104 
MD 47,224 246 .0052 
MO 19,501 350 .0179 
NM 12,404 2 .0002 
OH 41,184 410 .0100 
PA 42,219 272 .0064 
TX 186,684 581 .0031 
WA 17,923 66 .0037 
Overall 568,101 5133 .0090 
Note: See text for details of matching procedure. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Under State Supervision 
(100=yes), Low-Risk 
Sample
Under State Supervision 
(100=yes), High-Risk 
Sample
Voted in 2010 (1=yes) -0.483*** -0.196*** -1.475***
[0.044] [0.034] [0.156]
African American (1=yes) 0.688*** 0.693*** 0.316*** 2.814**
[0.030] [0.030] [0.027] [1.202]
Hispanic (1=yes) 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.242*** 1.204
[0.036] [0.036] [0.032] [1.211]
Female (1=yes) -1.241*** -1.239*** -0.513*** -3.748***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.025] [0.149]
Gender Unknown (1=yes) -0.709*** -0.711*** -0.178*** -1.733***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.037] [0.130]
Proportion Black 0.283*** 0.282*** 0.128** 0.121
[0.066] [0.066] [0.050] [0.188]
Proportion Hispanic -0.640*** -0.639*** -0.077 -1.832***
[0.078] [0.078] [0.061] [0.316]
Proportion of Kids < 18 0.369*** 0.364*** 0.108** 0.960***
     in Female Headed Household [0.074] [0.074] [0.055] [0.216]
Proportion of Families Below 0.375*** 0.369*** -0.059 1.115***
     the Poverty Rate [0.116] [0.116] [0.081] [0.326]
Proportion of Families Receiving 0.439 0.434 0.017 1.750**
     Public Assistance [0.296] [0.296] [0.217] [0.784]
Proportion of Population Over 25 1.252*** 1.243*** 0.316*** 3.223***
     w/. < High School [0.124] [0.124] [0.092] [0.406]
Log Pop. Density -0.022** -0.022** 0.000 -0.076**
     (1000 persons per sq mi.) [0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.039]
Constant 0.236*** 0.253*** 0.218*** -3.411***
[0.034] [0.034] [0.031] [1.224]
Observations 552525 552525 411477 141048
R2 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.010
Mean of Outcome in Sample 0.880 0.880 0.343 2.446
Includes State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Marginal Effect of Voting in 2010 from Probit Model -0.542 -0.204 -1.570
Under State Supervision (100=yes)
Table 2: Observational Benchmark: Relationship Between Voting in 2010 and Subsequent State Supervision
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable coded as 0=no, 100=yes. *p<.1; **p<.05; 
***p<.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated (Sent Registration 0.488*** 0.485*** 0.552*** 0.548*** 0.301** 0.304**
     Form 2010, 1=yes) [0.071] [0.071] [0.084] [0.084] [0.135] [0.135]
African American (1=yes) 1.014*** 1.018*** 1.941***
[0.084] [0.091] [0.107]
Hispanic (1=yes) -0.228** -0.313*** 1.352***
[0.091] [0.095] [0.180]
Female (1=yes) 0.426*** 0.413*** 0.340**
[0.050] [0.065] [0.147]
Gender Unknown (1=yes) -0.367*** -0.523*** 0.013
[0.064] [0.083] [0.118]
Proportion Black -0.191* -0.166 -0.213
[0.111] [0.139] [0.197]
Proportion Hispanic 0.208 0.337** -0.232
[0.146] [0.168] [0.327]
Proportion of Kids < 18 -1.024*** -1.107*** -0.785***
     in Female Headed Household [0.121] [0.148] [0.211]
Proportion of Families Below -1.261*** -1.372*** -0.962***
     the Poverty Rate [0.177] [0.219] [0.301]
Proportion of Families Receiving -1.011** -1.439*** -0.537
     Public Assistance [0.447] [0.555] [0.762]
Proportion of Population Over 25 -1.794*** -1.735*** -1.955***
     w/. < High School [0.201] [0.243] [0.374]
Log Pop. Density -0.094*** -0.058** -0.233***
     (1000 persons per sq mi.) [0.021] [0.023] [0.045]
Constant 2.994*** 2.511*** 2.936*** 2.574*** 2.328*** 2.326***
[0.115] [0.067] [0.124] [0.079] [0.345] [0.127]
Observations 552525 552525 411477 411477 141048 141048
R2 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000
F-test Statistic 121.03 46.09 102.77 42.63 63.46 5.06
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025
Mean of Outcome in Sample 2.511 2.511 2.574 2.574 2.326 2.326
Includes State Fixed Effects? Yes No Yes No Yes No
Average Marginal Effect of Treatment from Probit Model 0.481 0.485 0.549 0.548 0.285 0.304
Table 3: Experimental Estimates: Effect of Outreach on 2010 Participation
Voted in 2010 (100=yes)
Voted in 2010 (100=yes), High-
Risk Sample
Voted in 2010 (100=yes), Low-
Risk Sample
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable coded as 0=no, 100=yes. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.























Treated (Sent Registration 0.045 0.064** -0.006
     Form 2010, 1=yes) [0.041] [0.028] [0.137]
Voted in 2010 (1=yes) 9.183 11.598** -1.924
[8.440] [5.352] [45.531]
African American (1=yes) 0.688*** 0.595*** 0.314*** 0.196*** 2.785** 2.822*
[0.031] [0.091] [0.027] [0.062] [1.202] [1.478]
Hispanic (1=yes) 0.365*** 0.385*** 0.243*** 0.279*** 1.184 1.210
[0.036] [0.042] [0.032] [0.037] [1.211] [1.346]
Female (1=yes) -1.241*** -1.280*** -0.514*** -0.562*** -3.753*** -3.746***
[0.028] [0.046] [0.025] [0.035] [0.149] [0.218]
Gender Unknown (1=yes) -0.709*** -0.676*** -0.177*** -0.116** -1.733*** -1.733***
[0.045] [0.055] [0.037] [0.048] [0.130] [0.130]
Proportion Black 0.283*** 0.300*** 0.128** 0.148*** 0.124 0.120
[0.066] [0.069] [0.050] [0.054] [0.189] [0.211]
Proportion Hispanic -0.640*** -0.659*** -0.078 -0.117* -1.829*** -1.833***
[0.079] [0.082] [0.061] [0.066] [0.317] [0.332]
Proportion of Kids < 18 0.369*** 0.463*** 0.110** 0.238*** 0.972*** 0.957**
     in Female Headed Household [0.074] [0.115] [0.055] [0.083] [0.216] [0.420]
Proportion of Families Below 0.375*** 0.491*** -0.057 0.103 1.130*** 1.111**
     the Poverty Rate [0.116] [0.158] [0.081] [0.112] [0.327] [0.547]
Proportion of Families Receiving 0.440 0.533* 0.021 0.188 1.758** 1.747**
     Public Assistance [0.296] [0.311] [0.217] [0.238] [0.785] [0.822]
Proportion of Population Over 25 1.252*** 1.416*** 0.319*** 0.521*** 3.251*** 3.214***
     w/. < High School [0.124] [0.196] [0.092] [0.134] [0.406] [0.976]
Log Pop. Density -0.022** -0.013 0.000 0.007 -0.073* -0.077
     (1000 persons per sq mi.) [0.010] [0.013] [0.007] [0.008] [0.039] [0.113]
Constant 0.196*** -0.079 0.154*** -0.187 -3.444*** -3.399**
[0.050] [0.292] [0.040] [0.187] [1.233] [1.720]
Observations 552525 552525 411477 411477 141048 141048
R2 0.013 0.002 0.010
Mean of Outcome in Sample 0.880 0.880 0.343 0.343 2.446 2.446
Includes State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Marginal Effect of Treatment from Probit Model 0.048 0.064 -0.026
Table 4: Experimental Estimates: Effect of Outreach and Participation on Subsequent State Supervision
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable coded as 0=no, 100=yes. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01. In even numbered columns, these are 
second stage estimates from two-staged least squares estimates. See Table 3 for first stage results.
